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Abstract—The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol [GKL15] is
an abstraction of the bitcoin proof-of-work consensus
protocol. We use a model-checking tool (UPPAAL-
SMC) to examine the concrete security of proof-of-
work consensus by varying protocol parameters and
using an adversary that leverages the selfish mining
strategy introduced in [GKL15]. We provide insights
into modeling proof-of-work protocols and demon-
strate tradeoffs between operating parameters. Apply-
ing this methodology to protocol design options, we
show that the uniform tie-breaking rule from [ES18]
decreases the failure rate of the chain quality property,
but increases the failure rate of the common prefix
property. This tradeoff illustrates how design decisions
affect protocol properties, within a range of concrete
operating conditions, in a manner that is not evident
from prior asymptotic analysis.
1. Introduction
Bitcoin is widely used, with a current market
capitalization of over 120 billion USD. Given the
massive level of economic activity and the potential
for future growth, it is natural to ask: how confident
can we be in the security and reliability of this
system and its variants? While practical experience
suggests that Bitcoin and related systems are robust
against various kinds of misuse, their security rest
on a combination of features whose interactions are
not fully understood. For example, could advances
in computing change the balance of power between
honest miners and adversaries?
Initial studies of blockchain security [GKL15;
LG20] have proved some fundamental relationships
involving security parameters and the probabilities of
desired properties. In this paper, we develop a formal
model based on the Bitcoin Backbone Protocol
abstraction [GKL15] and use a statistical model
checking tool (UPPAAL-SMC) to study its security.
We focus on how the properties of the backbone
protocol vary as a function of concrete parameters,
in a network where an adversary is capable of selfish
mining (delaying the release of malicious blocks).
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We demonstrate a way to model the backbone pro-
tocol in the presence of a selfish-mining adversary.
• We quantitatively analyze a concrete trade-off
between different security properties, based on how
honest miners act on receiving new blocks.
• We demonstrate how the failure rate of the back-
bone properties vary with different values of f ,
where f is the probability that at least one honest
party mines a block in a round, a parameter that
is different for different cryptocurrencies.
The paper is divided into the following sections.
In Section 2, we provide an overview of the Bit-
coin Backbone Protocol, which is the basis for our
UPPAAL-SMC model. In Section 3 we describe
how we model the backbone protocol using the
tool. In Section 4 we describe our results. Finally,
Section 5 provides an overview of related work,
Section 6 outlines potential future work, and Section
7 concludes.
2. Overview of the Backbone Protocol
The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol was introduced
in [GKL15] and subsequently improved in [GKL16;
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LG20]. The aim of the backbone protocol is to
analyze the core mechanisms of proof-of-work con-
sensus protocols and provide more detailed secu-
rity guarantees than those provided by Nakamoto’s
whitepaper [Nak08]. The protocol captures key ele-
ments of Bitcoin and related Proof-of-Work (PoW)
consensus protocols that are use in other blockchains.
The protocol represents time as a series of
discrete rounds, each short enough so that the prob-
ability of any party completing the work needed to
write a new block is low. Each round proceeds as
follows:
1) Start: Each miner starts the round with a pre-
ferred current chain.
2) Check: Each miner begins the round by check-
ing for new chains.
3) Adopt: Each honest miner adopts the best chain
visible to it, using a selection criteria that is
defined by the blockchain.
4) Mine: Each miner queries a cryptographic hash
function. If they probabilistically succeed with
proof of work in this round, they append a block
to their chain.
5) Broadcast: Any miner that modifies its local
chain will broadcast its new chain to other
parties.
In modeling the backbone protocol, a party may
be designated as honest or adversarial. Honest parties
will immediately share blocks they find, and select
their chain based on the protocol’s designated chain
selection algorithm. They will not deviate from the
steps outlined above.
The protocol adversary represents a possible
coalition of malicious miners. The adversary is there-
fore able to query the cryptographic hash function
and produce blocks, with a success probability per
round that may differ from a single honest miner.
In addition, a possible network advantage of the
adversary is represented by allowing the adversary
to inject messages into any miner’s input channel
and reorder any input channel at will.1 The adversary
can also select a preferred chain arbitrarily (rather
1. We use ”input channel” to mean the same thing as ”RE-
CEIVE()” from [GKL15].
than using the honest selection criteria given in step
3 above) and withhold blocks in order to transmit
them at a later round.
In [GKL15], the authors make certain assump-
tions about the system:
• The protocol is executed by a fixed number of
parties n.
• Parties do not know the source of messages.
• All messages are delivered by the end of a round.2
• All parties involved are allowed the same number
of queries to a cryptographic hash function, for the
PoW computation.
The protocol parameters from [GKL15] that are
relevant to our work are shown in Figure 1; the
reader may consult [GKL15] for further detail.
λ: security parameter
n: number of parties
t: number of parties controlled by the adversary
f : probability at least one honest party finds a PoW in a round
: concentration of random variables in typical executions
µ: proportion of blocks in honest chains that were mined by honest parties
k: number of blocks for common prefix
`: number of blocks for chain quality
s: rounds for chain growth property
τ : chain growth parameter
Figure 1: Positive integers n, t, s, `, k; positive reals
f, , µ, τ, λ, with f, , µ ∈ (0, 1).
If the modeling assumptions listed above hold
and the majority of parties are honest, the behavior
of the protocol can be described using the concept
of typical execution, introduced in [GKL15]. By
definition, a typical execution is a sequence of rounds
in which the random variables are close to their
expected values. A straightforward calculation shows
that a typical execution occurs with probability 1−
e−Ω(
2λf).
The desired properties of the backbone protocol
are:
• Chain Quality: Chain quality is the proportion of
honest blocks in the chain of an honest participant.
A subsection of ` blocks in a honest chain will
have at least µ` blocks that were mined by honest
parties. Note that ` ≥ 2λf for provable security.
2. This assumption is for the synchronous model of [GKL15].
• Common Prefix: The common prefix property holds
if honest parties that prune k blocks from their
chain share a common view with another honest
party. In a typical execution the common prefix
holds for k ≥ 2λf.
• Chain Growth: The chain growth property mea-
sures how quickly the chains of honest parties grow.
Given that τ = (1 - )f, honest chains grow at least
as fast as τ · s in a typical execution. Note that s
≥ λ.
The authors of [GKL15] show that if these
properties hold, then persistence and liveness, which
are crucial to the robustness of the system, also hold.
Persistence states that once a transaction reported
by an honest party becomes ‘deep enough’ in a
blockchain, it is present in the chain of every other
honest party at the same position. Liveness states
that any transaction that comes from an honest party,
and is provided to all other honest parties, will be
inserted into all honest ledgers. The authors note that
persistence and liveness are not proof that Bitcoin
meets all of its objectives, as the analysis assumes
the number of parties is fixed and there is an honest
majority.
[GKL15] also provides a similar analysis for a
network setting which is not highly synchronous,
meaning there is an upper bound on the amount of
rounds a message takes to be delivered. We omit a
discussion of this because it is beyond the scope of
our study, but extending our analysis to this model
remains a potential direction for future work.
3. Modeling the Backbone Protocol
In this section we introduce our model checking
formalism of the backbone protocol. We first define
the following for each participant in the protocol:
• Input channel: Chains from other participants will
be sent to a participant’s input channel.
• Output channel: When a participant successfully
mines a block, it sends its newly mined block to
its output channel, to be broadcasted to the rest of
the network.
Algorithm 2: Honest Mining
Input: Honest miner m
check input channel and update bestBlock[m]
if Mining success then
create newBlock
publish newBlock with newBlock 7→ bestBlock[m]
set bestBlock[m] = newBlock
Algorithm 3: Adversarial Mining
Input: Adversarial miner a
decide strategy and update arbitraryBlock[a]
if advMiningSuccess then
create badBlock 7→ arbitraryBlock[a]
publish badBlock or keep private
route published and private blocks to honest miners, at will
We now present how honest and adversarial
participants are modeled in the protocol. Honest
participants are modeled by Algorithm 2 (above),
and the adversary is modeled by Algorithm 3 (above).
As shown in Algorithm 2, bestBlock is a global
array that stores the head of each miner’s blockchain.
At the beginning of each round, an honest miner
checks its input channel, checking its local chain
against any chains published in the network. The
miner then attempts to mine a block. If mining was
successful, a new block will be created and published
to the rest of the network. The miner will also update
its local blockchain by appending its newly-mined
block.
In contrast to Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 allows
an adversarial miner to decide the best strategy to
use in the current round, and keep blocks private 3.
In the first execution round, everyone adopts
the genesis block. In all subsequent rounds, honest
participants select their block by referring to their
input channels. The adversary may select their block
arbitrarily.
Figure 2 shows how the input and output channels
are updated at each round. Assume A, B, and C are
honest miners and A successfully mined a block in
the most recent round. Participant A will send its
block to its output channel. The block is then sent
to the input channel of all other participants on the
network. In the following round, the honest parties
3. Private blocks are not broadcasted to other miners.
Figure 2: Participant A broadcasts a block
Figure 3: Example of an adversary reorganizing an
input channel. BH is a block mined by an honest
party and BA was mined by the adversary.
will check their input channels and use a selection
algorithm to determine whether to adopt A’s block.
In the presence of an adversary, input channels
can be manipulated. The adversary can standby until
all honest parties have completed mining. This allows
the adversary to maximize the amount of information
they can account for when deciding their propagation
strategy.
When all honest miners have completed a round,
the adversary checks each participant’s output chan-
nel for blocks and set the order of blocks on each
honest input channel (Figure 3). By default, honest
parties will adopt the first chain they receive when
encountering chains of equal length. This allows the
adversary to rearrange input channels to win head-
to-head ties. The adversary also decides whether or
not to share blocks they have mined with honest
participants.
At the end of this process, the output channels
of each participant will include any blocks not sent
to the input channels by the adversary, but mined by
honest participants in the most recent round. At this
point all parties have attempted to solve the PoW,
and been informed of all blocks found in the most
recent round. The participants continue the process
above for a finite-amount of rounds.
3.1. Differences from Backbone Protocol
We now review the key ways that our UPPAAL-
SMC model differs from the backbone protocol.
• Parties: We model the adversary as one party. The
adversary has a mining power of α and the honest
parties collectively have a mining power of (1-α).
This is equivalent to [GKL15], where the adversary
controls a subset of honest parties.
• Transactions: We omit the inclusion of transactions
in blocks. This does not affect the outcome of the
backbone properties.
• Mining: Our mining process relies on probabilistic
transitions to either a success or failure state. This
avoids modeling hash functions. Our work does
not account for honest mining pools or a single
party mining multiple blocks in one round.
• Message Propagation: We assume that all messages
will be delivered at the end of a round. This means
no blocks are sent or received during the mining
phase of a round.
• Non-Determinism: Whereas the Bitcoin Backbone
Protocol quantifies over all possible adversaries,
we only model a selfish mining adversary. This
is because UPPAAL-SMC does not handle non-
determinism.
4. Results and Analysis
We now introduce the results we obtained.
UPPAAL-SMC simulates many runs of our system,
and then computes the probability of a property
holding. We use a 95% confidence interval. This
means that 95% of the time the true probability of a
failure event is within ±0.05 of the value computed.
4.1. Fork Resolution Rules
In Bitcoin, when honest miners receive multiple
longest chains, they adopt the one they received first.
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Figure 4: Failure rate of chain quality given two fork
resolution rules
We refer to this fork resolution rule as the “First-
Received Rule”. Under the first-received rule, a well
connected adversary can gain a large advantage. If
they are able to route their blocks quickly, more
parties will adopt their chain. The assumption in
[GKL15] is that all honest participants, except for
one, will adopt the adversary’s preferred block in
the case of a fork. We also make this assumption.
We begin by testing uniform tie breaking, an
alternative where an honest party adopts one longest
chain at random. This modification can limit the
network advantage that an adversary can obtain. No
matter the adversary’s propagation strategy, uniform
tie breaking will cause about 50% of parties to adopt
the block preferred by the adversary.
For each resolution rule, we use our model to
measure the probability of each backbone property
failing. For the following experiments, we let n =
8, α = 0.33, f = 0.02, and µ = 0.39. Like [GKL15],
we assume f ≈ 0.02 for Bitcoin.
In agreement with [SSZ15], we find that the fail-
ure rate of the chain quality property is consistently
lower when uniform tie breaking is used (Figure
4). Still, the failure rate under both resolution rules
decreases towards zero for large `. Large ` means a
longer subsection of blocks is checked against the
chain quality property, and prevents the adversary
from breaking the property by mining more blocks
than expected over a short time period.
We extend the work of [SSZ15] and test uniform
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Figure 5: Failure rate of common prefix given two
fork resolution rules
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Figure 6: Failure rate of chain growth given two fork
resolution rules
tie breaking against the common prefix and chain
growth properties. Our results show that uniform tie
breaking, assuming the adversary follows the selfish
mining strategy we implemented, has a negative
impact on the common prefix of honest blockchains
(Figure 5).
Under uniform tie breaking, the selfish mining
strategy from [GKL15] is similar to the common pre-
fix attack described in [KP15]. Because uniform tie
breaking roughly splits the honest participants onto
two competing chains, our selfish mining attacker
produces long forks with higher probability. Forks
are caused when the adversary releases a private
block or two honest parties find a block in the same
round. The forks take longer to resolve, on average,
because the parties equally mine on each branch.
We believe this is a practical implementation
of a common prefix attack because it is not clear
how an adversary could consistently force honest
participants to equally mine on competing chains
otherwise. Given that blocks are spread using a
gossip protocol, equally dividing the network onto
different chains would be difficult.
In [KP15], the authors state that uniform tie
breaking would not help against their common prefix
attack. They did not realize the rule could make
long-forks attacks easier to execute. Our adversary
follows the selfish mining strategy from [GKL15]
and lets uniform tie breaking do the rest. This
suggests that protocol modifications to Bitcoin may
have unintended consequences when only measured
against one property of the backbone.
The chain growth property is also used to com-
pare each resolution rule. We find that over long
periods the difference in performance between the
two fork resolution rules with respect to chain growth
is negligible (Figure 6).
4.2. Calibrating f for security and speed
Recall that f is the probability that at least one
honest party finds a PoW solution in a round. The
importance of calibrating f is made clear by Garay
et al [GKL15]. If the PoW puzzle is too difficult (f is
too small) then chain growth suffers. Too few blocks
are produced by honest parties, so liveness is hurt.
If the PoW puzzle is too easy (f is too large), then
the common prefix suffers. There are not enough
rounds where only one party finds a PoW solution,
so persistence suffers.
Fluctuations in f can be caused by variations in
the network’s hash rate or propagation speed. To keep
f in a small range, Bitcoin applies a PoW difficulty
adjustment every 2016 blocks. The difficulty of PoW
is increased or decreased depending on the network’s
hash rate. If the hash rate increases, then more blocks
are produced within a round (f increases). If the hash
rate decreases, then less blocks are produced within
a round (f decreases). Bitcoin adjusts its difficulty
so that blocks, on average, are produced every 10
minutes. Assuming a full round of propagation takes
up to 20 seconds, adjustments keep f between 2-3%
[GKL15]. Note that this only accounts for changes
in the network’s hash rate.
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Changes in block propagation speed are not
considered. Since a round is a period of complete
block propagation, f is subject to change when
network speeds change. In Bitcoin, block propagation
speeds have rapidly increased over the last few years
[Neu20]. For example, the time for a block to reach
99% of nodes has decreased from 11 seconds to 2
seconds.4 It follows that f , a key parameter, has de-
creased as well. Because f can change unexpectedly,
4. Over the period from 2017 to 2020.
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Figure 9: Overview of parameter space for common
prefix property
measuring a cryptocurrency’s behavior over a range
of f values is important.
For the following experiments, we let n = 8, α =
0.33, and µ = 0.39. Over a range of f values, we
find that Bitcoin has very different security properties.
For smaller values of f , the failure rate of the chain
quality and common prefix properties converge faster
(Figures 7, 8, 9). When the failure rate of chain
quality converges faster, then we can look at a
shorter length of blocks and be confident there are µ`
honest blocks. When the common prefix converges
faster, we can wait for less block confirmations and
be confident that double spending will not occur.
While these behaviors help with security, they do not
help with transaction processing speed. To improve
transaction processing speed, a cryptocurrency must
increase its block generation rate [KP15].
Decreasing block generation times provide an
opportunity for increased transaction throughput. If
a cryptocurrency can improve its block propagation
speed enough, then the block generation rate can be
decreased such that f stays constant. The behavior
of the chain quality and common prefix properties
will be the same, but blocks and transactions will
be produced more rapidly.
In the case of Bitcoin, this raises a question:
should cryptocurrencies aim for idealogical or secu-
rity based consistency? While Bitcoin block genera-
tion rate is kept at 10 minutes, this does not guarantee
consistency from the backbone perspective. Bitcoin,
from the perspective of the backbone protocol, has
changed greatly over the last few years.
5. Related Work
[Cha+15] and [FC18] use UPPAAL SMC to
model Bitcoin, but do not build off the backbone pro-
tocol. [Cha+15] analyzes double spending, whereas
[FC18] analyzes an Andresen attack. Neither model
chain quality or chain growth.
[Ger+16] provide a framework for modeling
the security of PoW blockchains using a Markov
Decision Process. They also show that selfish mining
is not always a rational strategy. Still, their rational
attacker model does not account for incentives out-
side of blockchain. For example, an attacker may
lose bitcoin during an attack, but have a payoff in
USD. 5
In [SSZ15] the authors measure the effects of
uniform tie breaking on the profit threshold for
selfish mining. By looking at the revenue of the
adversary, [SSZ15] implicitly measures the chain
quality property from [GKL15]. Their results showed
that uniform tie breaking limited the power of
strongly communicating attackers, but enhanced the
power of poorly communicating attackers. Still, no
work was done to directly measure the effects of
this modification on the common prefix and chain
growth properties.
6. Future Work
Some avenues for future work are:
• Other adversarial strategies: Our model can be
used to model other adversarial strategies, besides
selfish mining.
• Delay-bounded model: Our model can be ex-
tended to the delay-bounded version of the back-
bone protocol, where rounds are not highly syn-
chronous, but there is a bound on the time it takes
for messages to be delivered.
5. Through financial derivatives or increased market share.
• Honest Mining Pools: Our work assumes all
honest parties have the same hashing capabilities.
In reality, different parties and pools have different
hashing capabilities. Future work could account for
this. This would capture the importance of certain
parties in terms of block propagation. For example,
it would be more beneficial for a selfish miner to
quickly relay his block to a large mining pool than
to a single miner with a negligible percentage of
the total hash rate
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a case-study of model check-
ing PoW cryptocurrencies using the Bitcoin Back-
bone Protocol as a foundation. We show how to
model the protocol using Statistical Model Checking
tools, and identify concrete security properties of
the protocol. We use the model to demonstrate
how design decisions can impact different concrete
backbone protocol properties in different ways, in
a manner that is not obvious from prior asymptotic
analysis.
This paper attempts to explain the value of
applying the foundation introduced by [GKL15]
to practice. The experiments above map out the
effectiveness of a selfish mining strategy against
various deployment parameters. By doing this, we
are able to derive results that lay a direction for
further work in the design and analysis of PoW
protocols.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors thank Marco Patrignani (Stanford
University) and Avradip Mandal, Hart Montgomery,
Arnab Roy (Fujitsu Laboratories of America Inc.) for
their assistance and insight in formulating the ideas
underlying our model and results. The authors thank
the Office of Naval Research for support through
grant N00014-18-1-2620, Accountable Protocol Cus
tomization.
References
[Nak08] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-
Peer Electronic Cash System. Dec. 2008.
URL: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
[Cha+15] Kaylash Chaudhary et al. “Modeling
and Verification of the Bitcoin Protocol”.
In: Electronic Proceedings in Theoreti-
cal Computer Science 196 (Nov. 2015),
pp. 46–60.
[GKL15] Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos
Leonardos. “The Bitcoin Backbone Pro-
tocol: Analysis and Applications”. In:
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT
2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence. Springer, 2015, pp. 281–310.
[KP15] Aggelos Kiayias and Giorgos Pana-
giotakos. “Speed-Security Tradeoffs in
Blockchain Protocols”. In: IACR Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive 2015 (2015), p. 1019.
[SSZ15] Ayelet Sapirshtein, Yonatan Sompolin-
sky, and Aviv Zohar. “Optimal Selfish
Mining Strategies in Bitcoin”. In: Finan-
cial Cryptography. 2015.
[GKL16] Juan A. Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and
Nikos Leonardos. “The Bitcoin Back-
bone Protocol with Chains of Variable
Difficulty.” In: IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive (2016), p. 1048.
[Ger+16] Arthur Gervais et al. “On the se-
curity and performance of proof of
work blockchains”. In: Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference on
computer and communications security.
2016, pp. 3–16.
[ES18] Ittay Eyal and Emin Gu¨n Sirer. “Ma-
jority is not enough: bitcoin mining is
vulnerable”. In: Communications of the
ACM 61.7 (June 2018), pp. 95–102.
[FC18] Ansgar Fehnker and Kaylash Chaudhary.
“Twenty Percent and a Few Days – Op-
timising a Bitcoin Majority Attack”. In:
NASA Formal Methods. Springer Inter-
national Publishing, 2018, pp. 157–163.
[LG20] Jing Li and Dongning Guo. “Continuous-
Time Analysis of the Bitcoin and
Prism Backbone Protocols”. In:
arXiv:2001.05644 [cs] (Jan. 2020).
[Neu20] Till and Neudecker. DSN Bitcoin Mon-
itoring. 2020. URL: https://dsn.tm.kit.
edu/bitcoin/index.html.
9. Modeling the Bitcoin Backbone Pro-
tocol in UPPAAL
In this section, we provide details on how
we modeled the Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with
UPPAAL-SMC.
9.1. Global Declarations
To model the backbone protocol, we designed
three custom data structures: Block, Global Ledger,
and Diffusion.
Declaration 4: Block
typedef struct {
int[0, node max] id;
int[0, total run time] rd;
int parent;
int block num;
int length;
bool sent to[node max];
int[0, 1] is private;
int num adv blocks;
} Block;
Declaration 5: Global Ledger
typedef struct {
Block blockchain[block max];
int best block[node max];
int max len;
} Global Ledger;
Declaration 6: Diffusion
typedef struct {
int receive[node max][node max];
int receive len[node max];
int to be diffused[node max];
int[0, node max] to be diffused len;
} Diffusion;
Declaration 4 shows the structure of a block in
our model. Each block has an unique identifier, a
round number (indicating the round it was created
in), a parent id that indicates the previous block in
the chain, and a block number indicating the number
of blocks ever created at the time of its creation.
Each block also stores information such as its depth
from the genesis block, an array of participants that
the block was sent to, a flag indicating whether it is
held private, and the number of blocks created by
adversaries in its chain.
Declaration 5 shows the structure of the global
blockchain ledger. Global ledger keeps track of
every block created in the network with blockchain[].
Miners maintain their local chain by pointing to a
block in best block[]. Finally, max len tracks the
length of the longest chain(s) in the network.
Declaration 6 shows the structure of the diffusion
model. Diffusion models the diffusion functionality
used in the backbone protocol. A 2D array, mimick-
ing the RECEIVE() tape from the backbone, is used
to keep track of block propagation.
9.2. Honest and Adversarial Parties
As shown in in Figure 10 and Figure 11, we
modeled honest parties and the adversary separately.
Each state diagram consists of five non-trivial states:
1) Start: the start state of each round
2) End: the end state of each round
3) Protocol Failure: indicates a failure of one of
the backbone properties
4) No Block: indicates a party’s mining outcome
is unsuccessful
5) Found Block: indicates a party’s mining out-
come is successful
Each round begins at the start state and ends at
the end of round state. The protocol failure state
represents a failure in the backbone protocol. The
no block and found block states correspond to a
miners PoW outcome in the current round.
We note features of the state diagrams:
• One or more backbone property is verified at
the end of each round. In this example, the
expression check common prefix will force
a miner to enter the failure state when the
common prefix is broken.
• The probability that at least one honest party
succeeds in finding a PoW solution in a round
(f ), is captured with probabilistic edges. A
weight assigned to each edge is used to vary f .
• The synchronization channels mine! and mine?
prevent miners from starting a new round before
everyone has finished the previous round.
Figure 10: An honest party’s state diagram
Figure 11: The adversary’s state diagram
9.3. Property Checking Algorithms
At the end of each round, we check each honest
chain against one or more of the backbone properties.
If a party’s chain does not satisfy the backbone
property, the party enters the failure state of the
model. UPPAAL will terminate and consider this
run a failure.
We illustrate how property is checked:
• Common Prefix: Common prefix checks that
the block k deep in an honest chain is in every
other honest chain. This search is pruned by ig-
noring parties that point to the same best block.
This means they have identical chains.
• Chain Quality: Chain quality is checked by
counting the blocks in honest chains that were
contributed by honest parties. The share of these
contributions over any set of ` blocks should
be at least µ`.
• Chain Growth: Chain growth is checked by
iterating over the blocks of an honest chain
until a block s rounds or older is found. Chain
growth is satisfied if at least τ · s blocks were
found in this time frame.
9.4. Selfish Mining
As shown in Table 6, each block has a data field
is private. Our adversary deterministically chooses
whether to keep their blocks private. There are two
cases:
1) If the adversary’s private chain is at least one
block ahead of the longest honest chain, it will
release one block from its private chain for
every honest block that is published.
2) When the adversary’s private branch is depleted,
it will return to mining on the public branch.
